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BAR BRIEFS
with the Code of Hammurabi. Id. p. 410. But gradually the power of the
father began to diminish and children were given some rights. Though
the common law did not recognize the right of a child to support from a
putative fathp.r, In re Zimmer, 64 N. D. 410, 253 N. W. 749 (1934), this
right has been recognized in all, states by statute, and many states regard
all children as legitimate. See Ariz. Code (1939) § 27-401.
It would appear, therefore, that an infant nullius is adequately
protected under statutory law, and that there is no reason why he should
be permitted to bring a suit in his own name against the putative father.
From a legal standpoint, the holding in Albanese v. Richter, supra,
is logical and just. From a moral viewpoint it precludes unfairness.
HUGH McCUTCHEON.

CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-KLEPTOMANIA
AS A
DEFENSE.
Judicial
efforts to keep abreast of other fields of science, particularly medical
science, have presented an interesting problem in jurisprudence in connection with the use of kleptomania as a defense to larceny. The defense has
been interposed based upon the theory that kleptomania is a form of
insanity.

The courts of the United States are divided as to the proper test
which is applicable in general to the defense of insanity. The so called
"right and wrong" test, as enunciated in M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark &
Finelly 200 (1843), has found favor in a number of American jurisdictions,
including North Dakota, and is used by them as the sole test of insanity.
State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223 (Gil. 178), 88 Am. Dec. 70 (1865) ; State v.
Throndson, 49 N. D. 348. 191 N. W. 628 (1922). However. in certain other
jurisdictions an additional test known as the "irresistible impulse" is applied.
Smith v. U. S., 36 F. (2d) 548, 59 App. D.C. 144, 70 A.L.R. 654 (1929) ;
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 SO. 854 (1886); 44 C.J.S. 20, sec. 2;
Vish. Crim. Law (8th ed.) sec. 383b; 1 Burdick, Law of Crimes, sec. 213
(1946) ; 1 Whart. Crim. Law (10th ed.) sec. 44.
In State v. McCullough, 114 Iowa 532, 87 N. W. 503. 55 L.R.A. 378,
S9 Am. St. Rep. 382 (1901), the accused was charged with larceny and
defended on the ground that he was a kleptomaniac. The trial court gave
instructions to the jury on insanity stating that if the acts were the result
and offspring of insanity, the accused should be acquitted; if of avarice or
greed, the accused should be convicted. This instruction was held to be
erroneous on the ground that kleptomania is an irresistible desire to, steal.
The court, in discussing kleptomania, said: "It is a weakening of the will
power to'.such an extent as to leave the afflicted onp Powerless to control
his impulse to appropriate the personal property of others, without regard
to whether such impulse is inspired by avarice, greed or idle fancy."
In other jurisdictions, where a similar problem has been presented,
the courts have refused to apply the "irresistible impulse" test to kleptomania and continue to apply the "right and wrong" test. Lowe v. State,
44 Tex. Cr. 224, 70 S.W. 206 (1902); State v. Riddle, 245 Mo. 451, 150 S.W.
1044 (1912) ; 22 C.J.S. 129, sec. 61, note 95-96; (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev.
569. The Texas court held that kleptomania is a defense to larceny only
where it deprives the defendant of his sense of right and wrong; but if he
is able to comprehend that the act is wrong, the mere irresistible impulse
is insufficient. Hence, if it is shown that the defendant did have sufficient
mental capacity at the time the act was committed to distinguish between
right and wrong, kleptomania will not operate as a defense.
While an irresistible impulse must be more than mere absence of
resistance or a theoretical rejection of free will, high medical authority
states that an impulse may be truly irresistible, although the actor is
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able to comprehend that his act is wrong. Waite, Irresistible Inpulse and
Criminal Liability (1925) 23 Mich. L. Rev. 443; Keedy, Insanity and
Criminal Responsibility (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 535. Adequate safeguards
are afforded, since the jury has the authority to weigh the opinions of the
experts and accept or reject them. Berry v. Chaplin, 169 p. (2d) 442 (1946).
It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that felonious intent is
an essential element of larceny. I Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 242 (1923).
Kleptomania is a recognized symptom of insanity, consisting of an irresistible impulse to steal. 32 C. J. 616, sec. 99; 1 Whart. & S. Med. Jur.
(4th ed.) sec. 603. However, a person suffering from kleptomania knows
the difference between right and wrong, but is unable to control his action.
State v. McCullough, supra; State v. Reidell, 14 Del. 470, 14 A. 550 (1880).
Consequently, if a kleptomaniac is unable to govern his acts or control his
actions, but acts under an irresistible impulse, he is not acting with the
requisite felonious intent.
On the basis of the above authorities and upon the marked developments in medical science, it appears that the adoption of the irresistible
impulse test as applied to kleptomania is a logical development; and that,
therefore, kleptomania, if in fact an irresistible impulse to steal, may be
a valid defense to larceny.
BURT E. SUNDBERG.

